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ABSTRACT 
 
Background Even though only 24.5 percent of the Rwandan households have access to 
the national power grid, the electricity supply has difficulties to meet the 
peak demand. Previous research has shown that lack of electricity is a 
constrainer for economic development and estimations show that Rwanda 
between year 2013-2025 will need to invest USD 6.9 billion in its power 
sector. Yet, the Rwandan government will only be able to undertake 44 
percent of these investments. The rest, 56 percent, needs to be financed by 
the private sector and a majority of these investments has to be covered by 
international investors. However, present institutional barriers may prevent 
a sufficient amount of investors to enter the Rwandan market and hence, 
impede further economic development. 
Purpose This thesis intends to identify the institutional barriers present for Rwanda’s 
power sector’s foreign direct investors and to examine how the investors 
perceive these barriers. 
Literature 
Review 
Rwanda has recently been subject to one of the world’s most atrocious 
genocides, a genocide which still today can explain the country’s lack of 
electric power. The literature review shows that a poor business 
environment, such as political instability, corruption, and poor government 
regulations are examples of institutional barriers hampering foreign 
investments. 
Methodology The thesis is based on a qualitative approach where the empirical data has 
been gathered through semi-structured interviews. This thesis is based on 
seven interviews, of which five have been included in the empirical data. 
Result The result shows that Rwanda’s power sector suffers from several 
institutional barriers, preventing foreign investors from entering the market. 
Standardized power purchase agreements and standardized concession 
agreements are frequently requested by the foreign investors. 
Analysis The barriers previous research identifies as vital for foreign investments is, 
to a large extent, also perceived as important by the foreign power investors 
in Rwanda. However, the Rwandan government have managed to reduce 
the influence of some of the barriers previous research identified as critical. 
Conclusion The conclusion states that Rwanda reached far in its creation of an efficient 
and investment friendly business environment. Yet, Rwanda still suffer 
from several institutional barriers. Rwanda needs to continue to reduce its 
institutional barriers in order to keep and attract foreign investors.  
Keywords: Rwanda, Power Sector, and Barriers for FDI 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This introductory chapter provides the reader with a review of Rwanda’s current situation and 
explains why the power sector is an important part of Rwanda’s economy. The chapter 
continues to explain how an increased inflow of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in Rwanda 
can provide a solution to the country’s significant shortage of electricity. Also, the chapter 
briefly discusses the challenges of attracting FDI and how institutional barriers may reduce 
the inflow of FDI. A problem discussion about these challenges will lead the reader into the 
purpose and research question of this study. 
 
1.1 Background 
According to Lynn (2014), the African economy is expected to be the fastest growing economy 
in the world and is estimated to grow from today’s size of $2 trillion to $29 trillion by 2050. 
Some of the explanations to this promising outlook are expectations about an increased and 
young population, increased life time and a significant increase in the size of the African middle 
class. Eastern Africa, and especially Rwanda, has a particularly interesting role in this 
development. Even though Rwanda is a relatively small economy, the country has for the last 
decade had one of the highest GDP growth in the world (UN Statistics, 2016). However, 
previous research indicates that growth in developing countries has to be supported by an even 
faster growing power sector, i.e. growth in the power sector is one important component 
enabling nation-wide economic growth (Castelloano et al., 2015). Hence, a continued growth 
in Rwanda’s power sector can be assumed to be necessary for Rwanda’s possibilities to 
maintain their high level of economic growth. Similarly, research has also shown that the 
correlation between a country’s Human Development Index (HDI) level and energy 
consumption is very strong, indicating that the power sector is not only important for a country’s 
economic development, but also for the general prosperity in a country (Ministry of 
Infrastructure, 2015).  
Even though only 24.5 percent of the Rwandan households have access to the national power 
grid, the electricity supply has difficulties to meet the peak demand (Rwanda Development 
Board, 2016). Occasionally this shortage of electricity forces the Rwandan government to shut 
down the electricity supply in certain districts (Ministry of Infrastructure, 2015). According to 
Castelloano et. al. (2015), instability in the electric supply and low levels of electricity access 
has a negative impact on economic development. Hence, increasing the power generation 
capacity and the connectivity rate, may provide potential for economic development in Rwanda. 
Furthermore, the production costs for electricity is about 50 percent higher than the average 
production cost in Africa. One of the explanations is that a large share of Rwanda’s power 
generation is produced by expensive diesel generators. Therefore, there is not only need for 
more power, but also a need for a shift from expensive diesel generators to cheaper and more 
sustainable options (Ministry of Infrastructure, 2015). Considering the Rwandan governments 
ambitious target to increase the electricity connectivity rate to 70 percent by 2018, the African 
Development Bank (2013) estimates that the projected demand will require a production 
capacity of 563 MW by 2018 and 1120 MW by 2025. A capacity of 160 MW in February 2015 
indicates there is a need for a significant amount of investments in Rwanda’s power sector.  
Including generation, transmission and distribution, the investment requirements in the 
Rwandan power sector is estimated to be USD 2.5 billion between 2013 to 2017 and USD 4.4 
billion between 2018 to 2025. However, the Rwandan Government is only expected to 
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undertake 44 percent of these investments. The rest, 56 percent needs to be covered by the 
private sector (African Development Bank, 2013). The African Development Bank (2013) 
claim that “mobilizing such private investment of such a magnitude is totally unpreceded”. It 
is clear that Rwanda’s private sector does not have these financial resources. Therefore, Rwanda 
is dependent on foreign direct investments in order to meet the projected demand (African 
Development Bank, 2013). 
 
1.2 Problem formulation 
Increased FDI in Rwanda’s power sector may have the potential to increase the economic 
development in Rwanda. However, statistics show that the FDI is rather limited in the country, 
in 2010 having a FDI/GDP ratio 80 percent lower than the average ratio in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(African Development Bank, 2013). FDI is often connected with high risks and institutional 
barriers may prevent foreign investors to enter the market (Soubbotina and Sheram, 2011). 
There are institutional barriers affecting foreign investors in all countries. Some of the barriers 
are necessary, creating a healthy industry. Nevertheless, it is important for governments to be 
well aware of how these barriers are perceived by the investors, ensuring that the barriers are 
meaningful and are not preventing “good” investors to enter the market (Blackman & Wu, 
1998). In Rwanda, it is not clear which the institutional barriers are nor how the investors 
perceive these (Korgh, 2015). Hence, a thesis examining these barriers is important.  
 
1.3 Research Question 
Based on the problem formulation, the purpose of this thesis is to examine the institutional 
barriers for foreign direct investors in Rwanda’s power sector. 
Hence, two sub-questions emerge: 
i) Which institutional barriers are present in Rwanda’s power sector? 
ii) How are these barriers perceived by foreign direct investors?  
 
1.4 Limitations 
A time frame of ten weeks limits the extent of this thesis. Hence, although it would be preferable 
to interview most of Rwanda’s power sector’s foreign direct investors, this has not been 
possible due to the mentioned resource restriction.  
 
The power sector is often defined as the generation, transmission and distribution of electric 
power. However, since transmission and distribution on the national grid is strictly managed 
and controlled by the government influenced organization Rwanda Energy Group (REG) and 
therefore not open for foreign direct investments, this thesis will be limited to focus on electric 
power generation.  
 
  
  
9 
 
1.5 Disposition 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This introductory chapter provides the reader with a review of Rwanda’s current situation and 
explains why the power sector is an important part of Rwanda’s economy. The chapter 
continues to explain how an increased inflow of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in Rwanda 
can provide a solution to the country’s significant shortage of electricity. Also, the chapter 
briefly discusses the challenges of attracting FDI and how institutional barriers may reduce 
the inflow of FDI. A problem discussion about these challenges will lead the reader into the 
purpose and research question of this study. 
 
Chapter 2: Theoretical framework 
This literature review intends to put Rwanda into a context, describing its historical background 
and its current situation. Further on, the chapter narrows down to discuss Rwanda’s power 
sector and its structure. The second part of the literature review discusses FDI and its impact 
on economic development.  
 
Chapter 3: Method 
The methodology chapter explains and discusses the logical base which this thesis is built on. 
The chapter starts with a description of the research design, followed by a description of how 
the data is gathered and how the respondents were selected. The chapter ends with reflections 
on the study´s validity and reliability and what is done to mitigate the risk of biased answers.  
Chapter 4: Empirics 
This chapter provides the reader with the gathered empirical data. The first part of the chapter 
gives an overview of the interviewees and their background. The second part provides the 
interviewees’ opinions and answers.  
Chapter 5: Analysis 
In this chapter, the empirical findings are analyzed and compared with previous research. 
Furthermore, since the purpose of this thesis is to identify how the institutional barriers the 
foreign investors perceive the barriers, this chapter also discuss which of the identified 
barriers which are perceived as most important by the investors. 
Chapter 6: Conclusions 
Linked to the research questions, this chapter discuss the final conclusions of this research. 
The chapter ends with suggestions for further research. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review intends to put Rwanda into a context, describing its historical background 
and its current situation. Further on, the chapter narrows down to discuss Rwanda’s power 
sector and its structure. The second part of the literature review discusses FDI and its impact 
on economic development.  
 
2.1 Rwanda 
Rwanda is located in central Africa with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to the west, 
Burundi to the south, Tanzania to the east and Uganda located north of Rwanda. This means 
Rwanda is a landlocked country with approximately 1 000 kilometers from the closest harbor. 
The largest lake is Lake Kivu and is shared with the DRC. In terms of surface area, Rwanda is 
Africa’s ninth smallest country and in combination with its population of 12 428 005, Rwanda 
has the African mainland’s highest population density (The world factbook, 2016). 
Figure 1 – Map of Rwanda 
 
Source: Nations Online (2016) 
Rwanda is a highly elevated country with green terrain and rainforests. Rwanda has several 
rivers and do hence have the prerequisites for hydropower.  The average temperature is between 
20 and 21.5 °C all year around and Rwanda has two rain seasons, one from March to May and 
one from September to December (The world factbook, 2016).  
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2.1.1 Historical Background 
Due to Rwanda’s inaccessible terrain, the country was one of the last countries to be colonized 
(History World, 2016). Despites its isolated location, Rwanda was officially given to Germany 
during the Berlin Conference in 1885. Yet, Rwandan’s did not know their land had been 
colonized until one decade later, when the governor Adolf Von Götzen first arrived to Rwanda 
(Our Africa, 2016). However, as a result of the First World War, Rwanda was in 1916 taken 
from Germany and in the same time put under Belgium’s administration (Our Africa, 2016).  
In 1935 all Rwandans were provided by identity cards, classifying the Rwandans into three 
ethnic groups: Tutsi (14 % of the population), Hutu (85 % of the population) or Twa (1 % of 
the population). This classification will later be one of the determinant factors enabling one of 
the world’s most atrocious genocides. The minority of Tutsis were favored by the Belgians and 
the tension between the ethnic groups in Rwanda increased due to the inequalities between the 
groups (Our Africa, 2016).  
During late 50’s, Rwanda underwent a democratization process. However, the Tutsi 
establishment were reluctant to this development since it resulted in a loss of their privileges. 
This resulted in a further escalation of the tension between the groups and in 1959, a violent 
incident resulted in the death of 100s of Tutsis (UN, 2016a). The monarchy was ended in 1961 
by a Hutu-led movement and the Republic of Rwanda was created. One year later, in 1962, 
Republic of Rwanda became independent from Belgium (Our Africa, 2016). Afraid of the new 
Hutu government over 100 000 Rwandans, mainly Tutsis, fled the country. As a response to 
the newly established Hutu government, a group of Tutsis started a guerrilla group which fought 
against the Hutu government and the guerrilla group conducted several attacks on the Hutu 
administration, each making the Hutus to kill civilian Tutsis as a response to these attacks. By 
the end of 1980, about 480 000 Rwandans were refugees in neighboring countries, mainly 
Uganda, Burundi and DRC (UN, 2016a). A group of Rwandan refugees, mainly consisting of 
exiled Tutsis in Uganda, created in the late 1980’s the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) which 
was a politic and military organization, which from 1988 conducted several attacks on the Hutu 
government (UN, 2016a). As a result, the Hutu government started in the beginning of the 
1990’s to broadcast aggressive propaganda, for instance claiming the Tutsis were preparing a 
major massacre on Hutu civilians (History World, 2016). 
Due to the increased instability and tensions in Rwanda, international pressure made the 
Rwandan Hutu president Juvénal Habyarimana to sign a peace agreement with the RPF’s leader 
in Arusha the 4th of August in 1993, putting an end to the civil war in Rwanda. This agreement 
was not appreciated by the Hutu establishment which had been in intensive fights against RPF 
in a civil war since 1990. Eight months later, the 6th of April in 1994, president Habyarimana 
were killed when his presidential plane was shot down just before landing in Rwanda. It is still 
today not clear whether it was the Hutus or the Tutsis that shot down the plane, however, the 
shoot down of Rwanda’s president became to be the immediate trigger to a genocide which 
resulted in the death of approximately one million Rwandans. Half an hour after the plane had 
crashed, road blocks were set up by the Hutus in order to identify and kill the Tutsis. The day 
after, national radio broadcasts urged civilian people to seek up and kill Tutsis and Tutsi 
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sympathizers. The genocide lasted for about 100 days and estimates says that about one million 
Rwandans were killed during the genocide (History World, 2016). All Hutus were encouraged 
to join in the hunt of Tutsis and those who refused were accused to be traitors and could face 
an equally formidable death. No or few mass destruction weapons were used and most of the 
killing were conducted with every day tools such as machetes, hammers and bludgeons (History 
World, 2016). 
As a response to the ongoing genocide, RPF resumed their military campaign against the Hutu 
government. The RPF was capable of putting together a well-disciplined guerilla force that 
made successful progress against the Rwandan army (History World, 2016). In the beginning 
of July, the Tutsi RPF had taken military control over entire Rwanda and the killing stopped. 
Hutu soldiers, governmental official and about 1 400 000 civilian Rwandans, mainly Hutus, 
fled the country as the Tutsi got in power. There was a fear that RPF now would go after the 
Hutus as a revenge of the genocide on the Tutsis. For the next couple of years, Rwanda remains 
unstable and in 1996, Rwanda gets involved in a military conflict with DRC.  
After the genocide, the country was totally ripped out and Rwanda was only a shell of a country. 
Its institutions and governmental system was destroyed and the trust between the people was 
damaged. Courts, official buildings and homes had been burned down and most government 
officials had either been killed or fled the country. 
In year 2000, Rwanda presented Vision 2020, which objective was, and stills is, to make 
Rwanda a middle income economy by 2020. Considering the poverty and terrible state Rwanda 
was in by year 2000, this strategic document was considered very ambitious. The following 
quote of only eight sentences represents the entire conclusion in Vision 2020, yet it gives an 
insight of how the situation looked like in Rwanda by year 2000 (Kaberuka, 2000, page 28). 
 “Conclusion 
VISION 2020 represents an ambitious plan to raise the people of Rwanda out of poverty and 
transform the country into a middle-income economy. Some will say that this is too ambitious 
and that we are not being realistic when we set this goal. Others say that it is a dream. But, 
what choice does Rwanda have? To remain in the current situation is simply unacceptable for 
the Rwandan people. Therefore, there is a need to devise and implement policies as well as 
mobilize resources to bring about the necessary transformation to achieve the Vision. This is 
realistic based on the fact that countries with similar unfavorable initial conditions have 
succeeded. The development experience of the East Asian ‘Tigers’ proves that this dream could 
be a reality.” 
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2.1.2 Current Economic Situation 
It has now been more than 20 years since the genocide and the development has been incredible. 
The last decade (2005-2014), Rwanda has had an average annual growth rate, in fixed prices, 
of remarkable 7.9 percent, making Rwanda one of the fastest growing economies in the world 
(UN Statistics, 2016). From having the tenth lowest GDP per capita in the world by 2005, 
Rwanda has since then more than doubled their GDP per capita and is slowly catching up with 
the rest of the world, in 2014 having the 15th lowest GDP per capita in the world (UN Statistics, 
2016). Rwanda has suffered from high inflation. However, since 2010, Rwanda has been able 
to keep the inflation rate below eight percent and the inflation rate seems to go in the right 
direction (World Bank, 2016). 
Figure 2 – GDP per capita & Inflation 
Source: Data collected from www.worldbank.org (2016) 
One of the reasons for the rapid economic development in Rwanda may be the country’s success 
in fighting corruption. In 2015, Rwanda was ranked as the African mainland’s second least 
corrupt country and scores rather well on a global basis as well, being ranked as the 44th least 
corrupt country in the world (Transparency International, 2016). Furthermore, the Rwandan 
government has acknowledged that the private sector investments will be an essential pillar for 
the country’s continued economic development and have therefore implemented several 
reforms intended to facilitate investments, for instance through establishing Special Economic 
Zones (SEZ) – a framework intended to promote increased private sector investments (Ministry 
of Trade and Industry, 2010). As a matter of fact, according to the World Bank’s data (2016), 
Rwanda is ranked as that African mainland country where it is easiest to conduct business. 
Even though Rwanda made great progress, Rwanda faces several challenges and is still heavily 
dependent on international aid. For the financial year 2015/2016, Rwandan government is 
estimated to be able to finance 66 percent of its own budget. Considering that Rwanda only 
financed 54 percent of its budget three years earlier, this number is still an improvement 
(Government of Rwanda, 2016). 
 
  
14 
 
2.1.3 Rwanda’s Power Sector 
Rwanda has one of the lowest electricity consumption per capita in the world. In the developing 
countries, the average yearly per capita electricity consumption in 2013 amounted 1200 kWh. 
In the same year, the average per capita electricity consumption in Rwanda amounted 42 kWh, 
clearly far behind other developing countries (Ministry of Infrastructure, 2015). One 
explanation to the low electricity consumption is the low connectivity rate. In Rwanda, only 
24.5 percent of the population connected to a grid or off-grid connection. A second explanation 
to Rwanda’s low electricity consumption is the low amount of available electricity. In 2015, 
Rwanda had, including the imported electricity, a power supply capacity of 160 MW (REG, 
2016). Occasionally, the supply is unable to meet the demand during peak hours (Ministry of 
Infrastructure, 2015). As shown in figure 3, the majority of the electricity is produced from 
hydropower. The second largest electricity source is diesel-powered generators (REG, 2016). 
During the last decade, Rwanda has begun to generate power from other types of sources, 
namely solar, peat and methane gas. The Energy Sector Strategic Plan (Ministry of 
Infrastructure, 2015) describes that these sources will play a significant role in the continued 
development of Rwanda’s power sector.  
 Figure 3 – Power Generation Capacity per February 2015 (% of total capacity) 
 
Source: REG (2016) 
The large share of diesel-powered generators causes several challenges for the Rwandan 
economy. Rwanda is often ranked rather high in international comparisons of investment 
friendliness (World Bank’s data, 2016). However, due to the large share of expensive diesel-
powered generators, Rwanda has one of the highest electricity tariffs in the world (Ministry of 
Infrastructure, 2015). According to Twagirashema and Lode (2013), today’s cost of electricity 
is one of the most important factors to Rwanda’s high cost of doing business and is a significant 
disadvantage for Rwanda compared to neighboring countries. Furthermore, Twagirashema and 
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Lode (2013) argue that improving the competitiveness of Rwanda will therefore not only 
require more electricity but also much cheaper energy (Twagirashema & Lode, 2013). 
Secondly, the consumption of fossil fuels results in massive emissions of dangerous substances 
into the atmosphere. Twagirashema and Lode (2013) continues to argue that the use of it has 
been important and have supported the development of the world’s economies. However, the 
problems of the CO2 emissions are getting worse and worse. To continue in this direction would 
be irresponsible. However, it would not be possible for Rwanda to stop using the diesel 
generators immediately, it would not create a sustainable development for Rwanda 
(Twagirashema & Lode, 2013). 
As previously discussed, the power sector is crucial for the development of the Rwandan 
economy and for the country’s future prosperity. The power sector is linked to almost all other 
sectors in an economy and a well working power infrastructure is important for the development 
of industries and businesses, social institutions, administrative offices and for the general living 
condition for Rwandan households (Ministry of Infrastructure, 2015). If the Rwandan economy 
is going to achieve reasonable level of growth, it is clear that the power supply in Rwanda has 
to increase, and that is rapidly (Twagirashema & Lode, 2013). 
As shown in Figure 4, there is a strong correlation between a country’s HDI level and electric 
consumption, indicating that an increase the power supply in Rwanda is not only necessary for 
the economic development in the country but also for the general prosperity in the country 
(Twagirashema & Lode, 2013). 
Figure 4 – Relation between Countries’ HDI Level and Electric Consumption (2012) 
 
Source: Data collected from World Bank (2016) and UNDP (2016). 
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The Rwandan government is well-aware of the power sector’s importance for the country’s 
continued development and have therefore formulized an ambitious strategy. The defined target 
shows that Rwanda aims to achieve a 70 percent connectivity rate by 2018 and a power capacity 
of 563 MW by the end of 2018 (Ministry of infrastructure, 2015). Expanding the power sector 
to that extent will require significant investments. The African Development Bank (2013) 
estimates that the power sector has to invest USD 6.9 billion between 2013 to 2025 in order to 
be able to meet the projected demand. Mobilizing this magnitude of capital will require an 
efficient market and a substantial collaboration between the power sector’s players (African 
Development Bank, 2013) 
 
2.1.4 The Four Levels in Rwanda’s Power Sector 
There are many stakeholders participating and influencing the Rwandan power sector. 
According to Korgh (2015), it is possible to divide the power sector into four essential blocks 
creating the back bone of the sector: i) the institutional level, ii) the investment level iii) the 
project development level, and iv) the customer level. Figure 5 illustrates how these blocks are 
linked to each other.  
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Figure 5 – The players within Rwandan power generation 
 
* Rwanda Development Board (RDB) and Rwanda Energy Group (REG) are non-
governmental organizations, yet under the government's influence.  
Source: Author (based on the literature review and an interview with Korgh (2015)). 
Figure 5 is only intended to visualize the broad outline of the power sector. The industry is far 
more complex and it is not uncommon that an actor is participating in several of the power 
sector’s activities. As an example, the Rwandan government is the main actor within the 
institutional level, but can also participate in the investment level, the project development as 
well as in the customer level.  
1. The Institutional Level 
There are several organizations regulating, or in other ways influencing, the framework in 
which the players in the power sector have to adapt to. It is the institutional level which creates 
the “game board” in the sector. According to Rwanda Development Board (RDB, 2016), the 
four most dominant governmental-linked organizations accountable for regulating the Rwandan 
power sector are; the Ministry of Infrastructure (MININFRA), Rwanda Utilities Regulatory 
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Authority (RURA), Rwanda Energy Group (REG) and Rwanda Development Board (RDB). 
These organizations do for instance influence the market through providing i) strategic targets 
and plans, ii) providing the framework of law, policies and regulations making these targets 
realistic, iii) approving the power projects, iv) negotiating the condition with the power 
producers, and v) handling transmission and distribution of electricity. It is the institutional 
level which is responsible for the institutional barriers foreign direct investors perceive as 
severe for the investment climate in Rwanda. According to Blackman and Wu (1998), some 
barriers may be necessary, creating a healthy industry. Nevertheless, some of the barriers may 
do more harm than good, making it reasonable to ease these barriers. It is also the institutional 
level which is responsible for attracting investors into the market. 
2. The Investment Level 
It is the investment level which owns and fund the power sector. The investors can invest in 
power projects, either through equity or debt investments. A debt investor can for instance be 
domestic or international banks. According to the African Development Bank (2013), some of 
the international debt investors in Rwanda’s power sector are the African Development Bank, 
Emerging Africa Infrastructure Fund and European Financing Partners. These types of 
international debt investors create an complement to the domestic debt investors. The access to 
domestic funds is limited in Rwanda and the interest rate is high, in 2010 averaging at 16.67 
percent (Trading Economies, 2016).   
The equity investors are not only one of the funders of power plants, but is also the ones that 
control and own the power projects. According to Korgh (2015), it is not unusual that the 
owners of a power projects change during the development of a power plant. For instance, there 
are examples where foreign investors construct and develop a power plant, but sell it when the 
power plant is fully functional. The power generation sector was up to 2000 closed for private 
investors but since then, private investors have been allowed into the market. However, 
Government of Rwanda is still the single largest equity investor.  
In addition to debt and equity investors, various aid organizations invest in the Rwandan power 
sector. These organisations do not only provide funds in form of cash, but do usually have a 
large portfolio of various ways to support power project. Sharing some of the debt investors 
risks, hence making it cheaper for the project developer to get access to money is one example 
how donors may intervene in the power market. In Rwanda, donor organizations play a 
significant role and it is clear that Rwanda won’t be able to achieve their ambitious targets 
without the aid organizations.    
 
3. The Project Development Level 
It is the project developer who are develop the power technology, manage the development of 
the project, construct and install the power plan and who are managing the operation and 
maintenance (NCST, 2015). It is not always the same firm that are responsible for all these 
processes and many of the activities can be outsourced to contractors. It is also not uncommon 
that the some of the equity investors also is managing some of the activities within the project 
development level. Government of Rwanda is still the single largest project developer. 
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However, according to their strategic document the power sector (2013), the government of 
Rwanda intend to reduce their participation in construction the power sector, letting private 
project developer manage the operation and maintenance. It is the project developer who 
represent the supply of electric power  
 
4. The Customer Level  
It is the customer which form the demand in the power sector. Approximately 24.5 percent of 
the Rwandan households have access to electricity – 23 percent with an on-grid connection and 
1.5 percent connected via an off-grid connection (RDB, 2016). It is REG which is responsible 
for transmission and distribution of electric power on the national grid. Hence, it is REG which 
purchase the power from all independent power producers (IPP) which are providing electricity 
to the national grid. Hence, it is REG and IPP who negotiate the price via a power purchase 
agreement (PPA). If an IPP provide electricity through an off-grid solution, the IPP will sell the 
electricity to the end user. The ministry of infrastructure divides the power sector’s customers 
into four groups, which is shown in Figure 5.  
Providing electricity through off-grid connection is an interesting topic in Rwanda. Rwanda’s 
target is to increase the access to electricity to 70 percent by 2018 (48 percent via the national 
grid and another 22 percent via off-grid solutions) (Ministry of Infrastructure, 2015). Increasing 
the off-grid connection from 1.5 percent to 22 percent in a few year is a very high target. 
Providing off-grid solution to households which is not used to electricity and in addition have 
a rather limited purchase power has been proven to be challenging and is often not economically 
viable without donors. Yet, in Rwanda there are examples of off-grid solution. However, these 
are connected to companies consuming a significant amount of electricity and with a sufficient 
purchase power.   
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2.2 Foreign Direct Investments 
There are many definitions of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), and is often described in a 
similar way as Adeleke, Olowe and Fasesin (2014, page 234) describes it:  
 
“Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is a direct investment into production or business in a 
country by an individual or company of another country, either by buying a company in the 
target country or by expanding operations of an existing business in that country. Foreign 
direct in investments is in contrast to portfolio investment which is a passive investment in the 
securities of another country such as stocks and bonds. World Bank (1996) conceptualized 
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) as investments that is made to acquire a lasting management 
interest (usually 10% of voting stocks) in an enterprise and operating in a country other than 
of the investors (define according to residency). The investors purpose being an effective voice 
in the management of earning either long term capital or short term capital as in the nations 
balance of payments account statement (Macaulay, 2012).” 
 
Foreign Direct Investments can be divided into two group – outward and inward investments. 
Outward investments refer to the investment going out from a country, while inward 
investments refer to investments that are coming in to the country. As shown in Figure 6, the 
world’s amount of foreign direct investments has increased significantly during the last 40 years 
(World Bank, 2016). Soubbotina and Sheram (2004) explain that the share of the outwards 
investments going to developing countries has risen to more than one-third of global FDI and 
mention liberalizations of the developing countries markets as one important explanation. 
Moreover, the authors explain that globalization has made this increase possible and that 
globalization has led to the disappearance of many of the investment barriers. Hence, 
globalization is one of the most important reason to this remarkable increase.  
 
Figure 6 – Foreign direct investments in the world (inwards investments) 
 Source: Data collected from World Bank (2016) 
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2.2.1 Foreign Direct Investments and its impact on growth  
Foreign direct investment’s impact on the economic growth has been under a thorough 
academic review during the last decades. The effects are not always obvious and academia has 
been split into two camps – those who have identified positive effects on economic growth and 
those who have identified none or even negative effect on economic growth. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to dived the outcomes of FDI into direct and indirect effects. 
 
According to Kastrati (2013), the direct effects of FDI on a country’s balance of payments 
account are the following:  
 
1. The initial investment is accounted as inflow/outflow on the capital account. 
2. If the FDI is a substitute for import of goods or services, it will improve the current 
account for the host country. 
3. If the FDI is used to export goods or services, the investment will result in an increase 
in the current account.  
4. The investment income appears as an inflow/outflow on the current account. The 
investment income constitutes of i) profit from overseas subsidiaries, ii) dividend from 
owning shares in overseas firms, and iii) interest payments from lending abroad. 
 
In addition to these direct effects on the balance of payments, there are several indirect effects 
that may have a significant impact on the national account and which may affect the growth in 
the recipient country.  
 
On one hand, research has shown that inward foreign direct investment causes a significant 
economic growth. Kastrati (2013) explains why the indirect effects may be significant, and 
gives examples of how the indirect effects can support economic growth:  
 
1) Technology spillovers 
2) Creation of domestic jobs 
3) Enhancement of competitive business environment 
4) Contribution to international trade integration 
5) Improving the social condition through bringing international technologies and 
standards 
 
Soubbotina and Sheram (2004) has in their book Beyond Economic Growth: An introduction to 
sustainable growth also a rather positive view on FDI. The authors explain that FDI can support 
economic growth, and can do so without adding foreign debt. Furthermore, the authors state 
that FDI usually brings advanced technologies, managerial and marketing skills and easier 
access to export markets – all factors which indirectly support the economic growth. Another 
spillover effect is the added competition between foreign and domestic companies. The 
increased competition makes the national markets more competitive and hence the national 
economy more efficient. The authors also emphasize that FDI, from an economic growth 
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perspective, is more favorable than portfolio investment. This because foreign direct investors 
tend to have a longer investment horizon and tend to be less sensitive to economic fluctuations. 
 
Adeleke, Olowe and Fasesin (2014) examined the impact of foreign direct investment on the 
economic growth in Nigeria between 1999 and 2013. Their findings show that the economic 
development is directly related to the inflow of foreign direct investments. The authors conclude 
that it is likely that foreign direct investments are a driver for economic development. Based on 
these findings, the authors argue that it would be beneficial for the Nigerian government reduce 
its investment barrier. A similar research (Onu, 2012), describes that the fast growing 
economies in Asia, also known as the Asian Tigers, owe their success to the significant inflow 
of foreign direct investment. The author continues to describe how foreign direct investments 
has increased the human capital and the technology level in the host countries. Todaro (1994) 
support this view in his book Economic Development. He claims that foreign direct investments 
stimulate economic development and points out increase in domestic technology level and 
human capital as two important explanations. Furthermore, Todaro (1994) argues that an inflow 
of foreign direct investments can fill the gap between domestic and foreign savings, hence foster 
economic development.  
 
On the other hand, a large amount of academic research shows on the opposite relationship of 
economic development and inflow of foreign direct investment. Mencinger (2003) argues that 
policy makers often exaggerate the benefits of foreign direct investment and overlook many of 
the issues. Mencinger (2003) continue to argue that foreign direct investment makes the host 
country vulnerable to financial shocks and that the fact that foreign direct investment will result 
in future outflow of GDP will create a structural deficit on the current account. Similarly, 
Kastrati (2013) discuss in her article The Effects of Foreign Direct Invesments for Host 
Country’s Economy the negative aspects of FDI. The author explains that large foreign 
companies in small economies can, and often do, abuse their dominant market position. 
Furthermore, Kastrati (2013) explain that some of the developing countries have overestimated 
the benefits of FDI since the countries’ current economic situation are not in a state where they 
are able to take advantage of the technologies or know-how. Kastrati (2013) also reflects about 
the increased competitions. In small economies, large foreign companies may outcompete the 
smaller domestic firms, resulting in a monopolized market and hence, a less efficient market. 
To conclude, Adeleke, Olowe and Fasesin (2014) explain that the impact of FDI on growth is 
not is not always clear. Previous research is a bit ambiguous in this matter, indicating that FDI’s 
impact of the national growth depends on country-specific conditions.  
 
As shown by previous research, foreign direct investments may affect the economic 
development in many ways and the effects are not conclusively positive. However, as described 
in chapter 2.1, foreign direct investments is a requirement in order for Rwanda to achieve their 
ambitious targets for their power sector. Furthermore, developing the power sector will be one 
of the pillar for the country’s continued development. Hence, attracting foreign direct 
investments is necessary for the government of Rwanda. 
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2.2.2 Institutional Barriers for Foreign Direct Investments 
In 1998, Blackman and Wu, examined in their article Foreign Direct Investments in China’s 
Power Sector: Trends, Benefits and Barriers the institutional barriers for FDI in China’s power 
sector. The authors identified eight barriers, most of them connected to poor governmental 
regulations. 
1. Ownership restrictions 
2. Rate of return restrictions 
3. Risks associated with project approval process (delays etc.) 
4. Ambiguity of relevant laws and regulations 
5. Risk connected to the foreign exchange rates 
6. Poor electricity pricing methods that not represent changes in costs 
7. Risk related to weak contract enforcement  
8. Credit risks of power purchaser 
 
Based on these barriers, Blackman and Wu (1998) examined how these barriers were perceived 
by the foreign investors. Their result shows that Ambiguity of relevant laws and regulations, 
Risks associated with project approval process (delays etc.) and Rate of return restrictions were 
perceived as most severe by the foreign investors. Ownership restrictions and Risk connected 
to the foreign exchange rates were ranked lowest. The authors conclude that some of the 
barriers may not be meaningful and the government should hence try reduce their importance. 
 
Blomström and Kokko (2003) describes in their article The economics of foreign direct 
investments: Investment incentives that the academic literature about why large foreign 
companies choose to investment in specific location often highlights the importance of market 
size and the level of real income, skill levels and know-how in the host economy, availability 
of infrastructure, trade policies, and political and macroeconomic stability. Furthermore, the 
authors explain that the academic literature haven’t had enough focus on investment incentives, 
which according to the authors are playing an increasing role in companies FDI decisions. 
 
Adeleke, Olowe and Fasesin’s (2014) discuss in their article about FDI in Nigeria how the 
Nigerian government could attract more FDI through reducing its institutional barriers. Firstly, 
the authors argue that it is of great importance that the Nigerian government strive for a stable 
political and economic environment, improvements of infrastructure, and increased security at 
all levels in the country. Secondly, the Nigerian government should focus on increasing the 
governments accountability and transparency, since these are barriers may prevent foreign 
investors to enter the Nigerian market. Lastly, by liberating the foreign sector through reducing 
other trade barriers such as arbitrary tariffs and expensive import and export duties, the Nigerian 
economy could reduce even more investment barriers. 
 
Soubbotina and Sheram (2004) discuss in their book Beyond Economic Growth: An 
introduction to sustainable growth the importance of institutional barriers when attracting FDI. 
The authors argue that FDI is allocated to those developing countries that offers the best 
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investment climate. Furthermore, the authors mention political stability, good prospects for 
economic growth, easy convertibility of the national currency and liberal government 
regulations as substantial factors creating a healthy investment climate.  
Based on data from 83 developing countries, Busse and Hefeker (2007) examined the linkage 
among political risk, institutions and foreign direct investments. Their result shows that 
government stability, internal and external conflict, corruption and ethnic tensions, law and 
order, democratic accountability of government, and qualitative of bureaucracy are highly 
significant determinants of foreign investment inflows.  Furthermore, the authors conclude that 
these political risks and institutional barriers matter the most when multinational corporations 
decides which developing country to invest in. 
In 2002, Asiedu (2002) examined whether the elements that affect foreign direct investments 
in developing countries affect Sub-Saharan Africa differently. The author’s result indicates that 
institutional barriers such as openness to trade do affect developing countries and Sub-Saharan 
countries differently. Due to this fact, the author concludes that suggesting policies that have 
been successful in developing countries may not be proportionately successful in Africa. Hence, 
it is of importance to identify the barriers present in various location. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology chapter explains and discusses the logical base which this thesis is built on. 
The chapter starts with a description of the research design, followed by a description of how 
the data is gathered and how the respondents were selected. The chapter ends with reflections 
on the study´s validity and reliability and what is done to mitigate the risk of biased answers.  
3.1 Research design and strategy 
This thesis intends to examine current institutional barriers for foreign direct investors in 
Rwanda’s power sector and to scrutinize how thesis barriers are perceived by the foreign 
investors. A qualitative approach based on semi-structured interviews form the base of how the 
data is gathered and analyzed.  
A qualitative study was elected due to several reasons. Firstly, a qualitative approach is more 
suitable than the quantitative approach when a researcher wants to explore and understand 
opinions and perceptions within the research topic (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Indeed, the investors 
opinions and perceptions is one of the main focuses of this thesis. Secondly, the qualitative 
approach offers more flexibility than the quantitative approach, enabling the study to cover new 
areas which hasn’t been explored by previous research (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Considering 
that the institutional barriers for foreign direct investors in Rwanda’s power sector may differ 
from those barriers identified by previous research, the qualitative approach appears to be 
suitable for this research purpose. Third, a qualitative approach may be preferable when the 
researcher aims to examine areas which are difficult to quantify (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Even 
though some of the potential barriers is possible to quantify (for instance: corruption, 
transparency and domestic security level), some barriers may be difficult to quantify (for 
instance: investment incentives, risks associated with project approval process, and risk related 
to weak contract enforcement).  Lastly, the qualitative approach enables the researcher to get a 
deeper and a more explanatory understanding of the research topic (Bryman & Bell, 2011). To 
understand why and how the institutional barriers effect the foreign investors lies within this 
thesis interest. 
3.2 Semi-structured Interviews 
The empirical findings consist of semi-structured interviews with stakeholders in Rwanda’s 
power sector. The benefits of this approach is that semi-structured interviews enables the 
interviewees to elaborate with their answers, providing more freedom to explore the 
interviewees’ opinions and perceptions. Hence, semi-structured interviews, compared to 
structured interviews, makes it easier to get the most out of each interview, considering the 
possibility to focus and narrow down on the questions suitable given the certain situation and 
circumstances (Bryman & Bell, 2011). 
The interview protocol is presented in the appendix and consists of five questions. Due to two 
of the interviewees’ request, the interview protocol was in two cases sent to the interviewees in 
advance. The empirical data is based on five interviews and all of the interviewees have 
extensive knowledge about Rwanda and its power sector. Four, out of the five interviews, were 
based on the previously mention interview protocol. The reason to why the fifth interview 
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wasn’t based on the same interview questions is further described in the description of the 
selection of respondents (chapter3.5). Accordingly to the previously described semi-structured 
interview technique, all respondents were allowed to elaborate with their answers and follow-
up questions were asked. All interviews were recorded and transcribed.  
3.3 Interview guidelines 
The full interview protocol is presented in appendix. However, this section describes the 
purpose behind each question:  
i) Could you briefly describe your company and your project in Rwanda? 
Purpose: To confirm I understood the project properly and to get an update about 
the project’s current situation. 
 
ii) Which are the reasons why you invested in Rwanda and not in other countries? 
Purpose: This question is intended to opening up the discussion. Furthermore, it 
gives an indication of which barriers which may not be present in Rwanda and 
which the incentives are for investing in the country. 
 
iii) Which institutional investment barriers have you experienced in Rwanda?  
Purpose: This is the main question and is intended to give a good understanding of 
the investments barriers for foreign investors. 
 
Follow-up questions: 
 
1) Are these barriers also available in other countries (Sub-African or the country 
of your origin)? 
2) Considering your firm-specific conditions, do you think you experience (or do 
not experience) barriers which other firms may experience? (Domestic vs. 
Foreign, Type of energy source, Large vs. Small, etc.) 
 
iv) What could the Rwandan government do in order to reduce these barriers 
and improve the business climate? 
Purpose: To get an understanding of which barriers that could be reduced and to 
get an indication of which of the barriers the investors perceive most limiting.   
 
v) Would these measures (implementing the actions mentioned in question v) 
result in more/earlier investments from your side?  
Some barriers may be seen as inconvenient or as “profit-limiting” for the 
investors, but may not change their investment behaviour. This question is 
intended to give an understanding of the sensitivity among the investors. 
 
3.4 Selection of respondents 
The respondents have been selected through a method, which by Bryman and Bell (2011) is 
explained as purposive sampling. This means that the respondents haven´t been selected on a 
random basis, but been found through identifying key players in Rwanda’s power sector. The 
key players in the Rwandan power sector were identified together with First to Know, the 
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National Commission of Science and Technology (NCST) and Carnegie Mellon University. 
These organizations also supported the author by establishing the initial contact with the key 
players. In order to get a holistic understanding of the barriers influencing the foreign investors, 
the author have tried to include respondents with different backgrounds. Hence, respondent 
with experience from both the institutional level and investment level have been selected. Ten 
organizations were asked to participate in this research. However, three organizations declined 
the invitation (Rwanda Energy Group (REG), KivuWatt and Gigawatt Global).  
As shown in Table 1, this thesis is based on seven interviews. However, three of these 
interviews has been focused on understanding the general conditions in Rwanda and have hence 
not been following the interview protocol presented in Appendix 1. Interview 1 to 3 have 
provided a basic understanding of Rwanda, its power sector, its challenges and how it is to 
conduct research in Rwanda. This has been essential in order to be able to formulate the research 
question and the research methodology. Furthermore, interview 1 to 3 have also provided an 
understanding of who the key players in Rwanda's power sector is. Furthermore, interview 
number 2 provided a good insight in the institutional barriers for foreign investors in Rwanda, 
and therefore, the answers given during this interview is included in the empirical data. 
Interview 4 to 7 have been following the interview protocol presented in Appendix 1. One of 
the interviews represents the institutional level. The rest (four interviews) of the interviewees 
have experience of foreign investments in Rwanda’s power sector.  
 
28 
 
Table 1 – Interview Overview 
No Name Position Organization Date Duration 
Location for 
Interview 
Purpose 
1 Interviewee 1 Analyst Government of Rwanda 2015-11-24 30 min 
Kigali, 
Rwanda 
Get a basic understanding of 
Rwanda and its power sector 
2 (a) I. Twagirashema 
Executive Director at Rwanda Investment Group, 
Chairman at Energy Private Developers and one 
of the two authors to Energy Rwanda (2013) 
2015-11-30 60 min 
Kigali, 
Rwanda 
Get a basic understanding of the 
Rwandan power sector and the 
investment climate in Rwanda 
3 B. Korgh Director 
Carnegie Mellon University in 
Rwanda 
2015-12-03 60 min 
Kigali, 
Rwanda 
Get a basic understanding of the 
Rwandan power sector and to 
understand the research conditions 
in Rwanda. 
4 (b) Interviewee 4 Analyst Government of Rwanda 2016-05-09 60 min 
Kigali, 
Rwanda 
Get an understanding of current 
investment barriers and how they are 
perceived by the foreign investors. 
5 (c) O. Ekman CEO First To Know Scandinavia AB 2016-05-11 60 min Skype 
Get an understanding of current 
investment barriers and how they are 
perceived by the foreign investors. 
6 (d) D. Klinck CEO East African Power Ltd 2016-05-13 45 min 
Kigali, 
Rwanda 
Get an understanding of current 
investment barriers and how they are 
perceived by the foreign investors. 
7 (e) H. Karasoy Director Hakan AS 2016-06-24 45 min Skype 
Get an understanding of current 
investment barriers and how they are 
perceived by the foreign investors. 
The letters in the bracket in the “No” column is the interviewees identification letter which is used in the empirical chapter. 
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3.5 Validity & Reliability 
This thesis intends to shed a light upon barriers for foreign direct investment in Rwanda. As 
described by Bryman and Bell (2011), interviews about flaws within your own system may be 
sensitive to some interviewees and may hence bias the answers. This may cause some issues 
with the validity of this study, and Bamberger (2009) describes that hypothetical bias may occur 
when the respondent systematically gives biased answers. For this reason, two things related to 
the validity has to be considered. Firstly, since investment barriers often are country-specific 
and is often viewed as flaws in the national system, it is not unlikely that the government 
representatives are not proud over all barriers that exist in Rwanda. This may result in biased 
answers. Secondly, since foreign investors in the Rwanda power sector need to have close 
collaboration with the government, it is not unreasonable to believe that these investors want to 
keep a good relationship with the government of Rwanda. Since expressing country-specific 
issues and flaws could be seen as something that would impair the relation, there is a risk that 
the foreign investors will provide biased answers.  
In order to mitigate these potential validity issues, two measures have been taken. Firstly, the 
purpose of the thesis has been thoroughly explained. By describing that it is essential for the 
Rwandan government to know how the investment barriers are perceived by the investors in 
order for them know how they can improve the business climate, the interview may appear to 
be more constructive and not something that is going to accuse the government for some current 
issues.  Secondly, even though not requested by the interviewees, interviews with government 
officials have been kept anonymous in order to allow them to elaborate on their own thoughts 
and concerns. 
Moreover, validity issues can also occur when the sample do not represent the population 
(Bryman & Bell, 2011). By including interviewees with different backgrounds, this validity 
issue can be decreased. However, it is possible that some of these validity issues still remain 
problematic.    
According to Bryman and Bell (2011), reliability issues can occur when the research is based 
on a small sample size (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Since only five interviews are included in the 
empirical findings, it is likely that this thesis won’t be able to provide a holistic and complete 
overview of all the institutional barriers present in Rwanda´s power sector. Yet, this 
methodology will be able to shed light upon the barriers some of the foreign investors perceive 
as most limiting. 
Furthermore, as described by Leech (2002, p. 665) “What you want to know determines which 
questions you ask. What you already know will determine which questions you will ask”. Based 
on this argument, there is a risk that how the questions are asked is changed between the 
interviews, making the interviews slightly different from each other. This may cause issues with 
the reliability. However, having a semi-structured interview can reduce this validity problem, 
since all questions follow a pronounced protocol. To conclude, it is clear that there are both 
benefits and disadvantages with the applied methodology. Furthermore, it is essential to 
recognize and acknowledge these disadvantages when analysis of the result.   
30 
 
4. EMPIRICS 
This chapter provides the reader with the gathered empirical data. The first part of the chapter 
gives an overview of the interviewees and their background. The second part provides the 
interviewees’ opinions and answers.  
4.1 The Interviewees’ Background 
As described in the methodology chapter, interview 1 and 3 is not a part of the empirical 
result, hence these are not included in this chapter. In order to facilitate the description of the 
interviewees’ answers, each interviewee is labeled with a letter. 
 
i) I. Twagirashema (a) is the Executive director at the Rwanda Investment Group, 
Chairman at Energy private developers and one of the two authors to Energy 
Rwanda (2013). As chairman in Energy Private Developers, Twagirashema has a 
good knowledge of the barriers the investors face. Furthermore, Twagirashema is 
also the chairman of Cimerwa, a Rwandan cement producer which recently invested 
in their own power plant. 
 
ii) Interviewee 4 (b) works as an analyst at one of the government of Rwanda’s 
departments. The department plays an essential role for the Rwandan power sector 
and influence the investment climate for foreign investors in Rwanda. The 
department also work closely with other governmental offices and support these 
offices in their contact with investors. Interviewee 4 has good knowledge about the 
investment process in Rwanda and the energy sector is one of the interviewee 4’s 
focus areas. The interviewee has frequently contact with the power sectors’ 
investors.  
 
iii) D. Klinick (c) is the CEO of East African Power Ltd, a renewable energy investment 
and development company based in Kigali, Rwanda. East African Power is the 
owner of several power producing companies, such as DC Hydropower, Afritech 
Energy etc. Klinick has an extensive knowledge about the investment climate in 
Rwanda and its neighboring countries. 
 
iv) O. Ekman (d) is the CEO for the Swedish company First To Know Scandinavia 
AB. Fist To Know has an extensive network and they support their clients to find 
hidden business opportunities. Some of their partner companies, which are 
developing new energy technologies, have pronounced an interest to expand in to 
Rwanda’s power sector. Ekman is supporting these companies to examine the 
viability of this expansion. 
 
v) H. Karasoy (e) is the director of HQ Power Rwanda which is one of the largest 
power investors in Rwanda. HQ Power is currently investing and constructing in a 
peat power plant which is intended, at the first stage, to contribute with 80 MW to 
the Rwandan grid (compare with Rwanda’s current 160 MW). Karasoy has an 
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extensive knowledge of the Rwandan power sector and the barriers which foreign 
investors face. Noteworthy is, peat is not considered as a renewable energy source, 
which means HQ Power may have different business conditions than the more 
renewable alternatives. This makes HQ Power to a good complement to the other 
interviewees. 
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4.2 The Interviewees’ Answers 
The interviewees answers are presented jointly, following the structure presented in Appendix 
1. The purpose behind each question is further explained in the same Appendix. The letters 
within the brackets denote which of the interviewees who supported which statement. 
i) Which are the reasons why you invested in Rwanda and not in other countries? 
 
All the interviewees express a similar view to why Rwanda’s power sector is interesting 
destination for foreign investments. More specifically, all interviewees express political 
stability, high electricity demand and low corruption as reasons to why investors see Rwanda 
as an attractive investment destination (a, b, c, d and e).  Furthermore, interviewee 4 (b) 
elaborate his answer and explain that Rwanda has become one of the most investment friendliest 
countries in Africa. Several of the neighboring countries cannot offer the same institutional 
stability as Rwanda can. For instance, the security level in Rwanda is far much better than the 
neighboring country Burundi and Congo (DRC). This makes Rwanda an attractive choice, 
especially for smaller entrepreneurs inexperienced of the African continent. Furthermore, 
interviewee 4 (b) continues to explain that the corruption level in the Rwandan government is 
exceptionally low which makes Rwanda to an interesting choice for aid organizations to invest 
in the country. The invested money simply goes where it is intended to go. Ekman (c) support 
these statements and explain that the low corruption and high security level are two important 
factors making First To Know to be especially interested in Rwanda. Since First To Know 
works with smaller entrepreneurs - some looking for their very first FDI opportunity - these 
factors are considered important by First To Know’s clients. Furthermore, interviewee 4 (b) 
mention that Rwanda recently implemented several investments incentive. Some of these 
incentives is intended to make the investment process more transparent and easier. For instance, 
on trial, Rwanda developed and implemented a renewable energy feed in tariff (REFIT) which 
gave smaller entrepreneurs of renewable energy transparent and profitable power purchase 
agreements (PPA) in the initial investment phase. The trial of the REFIT incentive ended in 
December 2015, and it has since then been discussions to implement an updated REFIT 
incentive in 2016. However, according the interviewee 4 (b), the process to develop the updated 
version have stranded and it is uncertain whether a new REFIT will be implemented. Another 
example of how the Rwandan government tries to facilitate for foreign investors in Rwanda’s 
power sector is by mapping out and marketing potential hydropower sites in Rwanda (c). 
Furthermore, Rwanda is currently developing investment incentives for off-grid solutions and 
the incentive is going to be presented in the second half of 2016 (b).  
Karasoy (e) describes Rwanda as a country with a good reputation and with a robust political 
situation, which partly depends on its strong and successful leader. However, the reason why 
Hakan AS invested in Rwanda depends on several additional factors. Hakan has it primary base 
in Turkey and the company was, for couple of years ago, approached by Rwandan officials who 
were interested of Hankan’s investments. Rwanda has a huge peat supply and the country 
wanted to examine the possibilities to use its supply for electricity. In order to attract Hakan to 
Rwanda, Hakan was offered several beneficial incentives such as tax reductions and a beneficial 
PPA. Karasoy (e) explains that the first impressions of Rwanda and its government were 
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excellent. Karasoy (e) continues to explain that this is area is vital in order to attract FDI. It is 
of great importance that the government officials make the investors to feel appreciated and 
welcomed to the country. Several other countries have not succeeded in the same way as 
Rwanda has. Hakan is now investing in an 80 MW peat power plant, which compared to 
Rwanda’s current capacity of 160 MW, will increase the country’s power capacity significantly. 
ii) Which institutional barriers have you experienced in Rwanda and what could the 
Rwandan government do in order to reduce these barriers and hence improve the 
business climate? 
 
All interviewees had interesting comments concerning the institutional barriers present in 
Rwanda’s power sector. Interviewee 4 (b) state that the investment process in Rwanda’s power 
sector is rather demanding and involves several critical stages. This is particularly true for 
investments larger than 5 MW. The government of Rwanda controls many of these stages and 
do hence, have an influence over which companies which reach to the final implementation and 
investment stage. Furthermore, Interviewee 4 (b) argues that this demanding process is 
necessary in order to control that only “good” and suitable investors enter the market. In many 
ways, the electric power sector differs to many other sectors due to its importance for the 
country’s development and due to the long contracts which are involved. According to 
Interviewee 4 (b), it is not uncommon with 25 years PPA and the government is hence keen to 
not sign unfavorable contract. Furthermore, Interviewee 4 (b) explain that due to these reasons, 
long and controlled investment processes is common in most counties’ power sectors. 
Moreover, Interviewee 4 (b) explain that the relation between the numbers of investors entering 
the first governmental controlled stage compared to the number of the investors that actually 
goes through all stages is significant. However, Interviewee 4 (b) state that the institutional 
processes shouldn’t be blamed for all the “losses” of investors. Some of the companies have 
too optimistic views on the investment process or in other cases represent a technology which 
is not economically viable. Yet, the fact that only a small minority of all interested investors 
actually fulfill their investments is according to Interviewee 4 (b) problematic. Rwanda is in 
need of more investments and a several of the investors do not leave the investment process 
because they are excluded by the government, but due to other reasons. According to 
Interviewee 4 (b), this circumstance indicates that there are barriers preventing investors to 
enter the Rwandan power sector. Furthermore, interviewee 4 (b) explain that lack of financing 
and internal business events are common reasons to why investors leave the investment process. 
Twagirashema (a) agrees that financing is problematic in Rwanda and explain that the financing 
situation cause several challenges for all power investors in Rwanda. Firstly, even exceptionally 
profitable power investments may be rejected by the Rwandan banks. Limited funds and 
inadequate knowledge are the two main explanations. In a matter of fact, Twagirashema (a) 
state that there is no single bank in Rwanda who has an employee specialized in the power 
sector. This result in banks which do not understand the power projects, and hence, tries to 
avoid these projects. Secondly, the interest rates are exceptionally high and it is not uncommon 
with interest rates far beyond 10 percent. These circumstances force the foreign investors to 
finance their investments by other means. 
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Klinck (d) state that the institutional barriers for FDI in Rwanda’s power sector depends on the 
power technology. Klinck (d) elaborate on three different energy technologies and starts to 
explain about the barriers for hydropower. According to Klinck (d), it is unfortunate that the 
government haven’t been able to prolong the REFIT. Rwanda is in need of standardized PPA 
which are bankable. Standardized PPA makes the investment climate more transparent and it is 
essential for investors to, in an early stage, be able to calculate on the investments viability and 
profitability. Furthermore, the Rwandan government should be transparent with their already 
contracted PPA, making it easier to benchmark with other investors. Klinck (d) conclude his 
argument about the standardized PPA to say that this will be an essential area for the Rwandan 
government in order for Rwanda to be able to keep investors and developers in the market. 
Klinck (d) continues his argument about hydropower by explaining the need of standardized 
concession agreements. The concession agreement gives the investor and developer the access 
and right to construct and operate on the hydropower site. Klinck (d) explains that there are 
several uncertainties connected to the concession agreements. Firstly, it is not easy to get access 
to the hydropower sites and the competition about the sites is fierce. Secondly, the government 
should be more transparent about which measures the government use when they chose to sign 
a concession agreement with an investor or developer. Furthermore, another barrier for 
hydropower investors is the lack of a well-functioning financing mechanism which makes the 
local currency more accessible. Moreover, Klick (d) points out that the Rwandan government 
needs to approve on a standardized investments process which is similar to all investors.   Klinck 
(d) end his argument about the investment barriers for hydropower by describing challenges 
with one of his own projects – DC Hydropower. DC Hydropower have for two years worked 
on its project to develop two hydropower sites in Rwanda. Yet, DC Hydropower haven’t been 
able to sign all necessary contracts with the government. This means that significant investment 
needs to be done even before the investors know if they will get access to a hydropower site 
with a bankable PPA. DC Hydropower have so far been financed by aid organizations, which 
according to Klinck (d), is necessary for smaller entrepreneurs to be able to profitability develop 
hydropower sites in Rwanda. Dependency on aid organizations also creates uncertainties and 
risks connected with the accessibility to these donor moneys. 
When it comes to solar, the barriers look slightly different. Off-grid solutions will play an 
increasing role in the power supply of Rwanda. Commercial and industrial solar is increasingly 
important in this areas. However, Klinck (d) points out that major institutional barriers currently 
prevent industries to develop their own solar projects. Hence, the Rwandan government needs 
to change its legislation and allowing industries to enter the power generation market. Actions 
necessary is changing the agreements for net metering and standardizing the agreements with 
Rwanda Energy Group (REG). Furthermore, since solar’s importance, the government should 
consider tax reductions, VAT exempts and other incentives for industries generating their own 
electricity.  
Similar to Klinck (d), Ekman (c) points out the uncertainties connected to the PPA and the 
concessions agreements as major barriers for FDI in Rwanda. Understanding the investment 
conditions in an early stage is necessary for smaller entrepreneurs who willing to invest in 
Rwanda’s power sector. Due to the lack of standardized PPA and concessions agreements, it is 
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difficult for investors to get a holistic understanding of the price levels and available 
hydropower sites. Ekman (c) continues to describe that Rwandan government has developed 
several incentives which is intended to attract foreign investors. However, it is important that 
these incentives are coordinated, creating a transparent investment climate. Ekman (c) request 
transparent and similar conditions for all investors. 
An interesting topic which were raised by three of the interviewees (b, c and d) were the risk of 
short term “energy surplus”. Indeed, Rwanda has one of the lowest per capita energy 
consumptions in the world. Yet, several energy projects are under development and Rwanda is 
likely to double its energy supply within a few years. The objective to connect 48 percent of 
the population to the domestic power grid may be too optimistic and hence, there is a risk of 
energy surplus. According to interviewee 4 (b), this is a growing concern for the Rwandan 
government. The government tries to avoid a situation where the government pays for 
electricity which is not used. This concern has made the government more restrictive with it 
PPA and is hence creating uncertainties for the power investors. Furthermore, Interviewee 4 (b) 
illustrate the condition as an “chicken-and-the-egg situation: “You need electricity in order to 
create demand, and demand in order to create electricity”. However, Karasoy (e) is of a 
different point of view. He admits the supply will increase drastically within the next coming 
years but ask a rhetorical question to describe his opinion: “How many African countries have 
you heard of which has too much electricity?”. Karasoy (e) continue to argue that the increased 
connectivity rate and the growth of domestic industries will require significant power, and 
hence, a noteworthy domestic surplus is unlikely. Furthermore, Karasoy (e) explain that 
Rwanda is about to connect its power grid to its neighboring countries in the east, which will 
allow Rwanda to export electricity in the case of energy surplus. A situation where the east 
African countries has excess of electricity is according to Karasoy (e) not going to happen in a 
near future. 
Moreover, Karasoy (e) explain that the institutional barriers present in Rwanda depends on the 
investment’s scale and technology. Barriers for larger investments, such in the case of Hakan’s 
investment, are connected to the government’s lack of know-how of handling these sizes of 
investments. Since know-how is developed through experience, it is according to Karasoy (e) 
understandable Rwanda lacks these skills. The country has never signed a PPA as large as 
Hakan’s, and hence, Rwanda’s institutions lack a holistic understanding of which risks which 
needs to be covered by the government. In lager projects, it is necessary with individual 
negotiations in order to secure beneficial contracts for both the investors and the government. 
However, for smaller projects, the investment process should be standardized. Smaller 
entrepreneurs do not have the financial strength to participate in long and expensive 
negotiations. Hence, it is important that the Rwandan government create a smooth way in for 
these entrepreneurs. Karasoy (e) continue to describe various challenges depending on the type 
of technology. Hakan is developing a power plant which is based on fossil-based fuel. Hence, 
the possibilities to get financing for NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations) are limited due 
to NGO’s aversion to support these kinds of projects. Hence, Hakan has to be economically 
viable without these kinds of market interactions, which put pressure on Hakan’s ability to 
create a profitable business model without external support. However, Karasoy (e) continue to 
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claim that getting excluded by donors isn’t necessary a disadvantage. The NGOs creates 
uncertainties and dependency, which in some cases prevent suitable investors to enter the 
Rwandan market. 
iii) Would these measures (implementing the actions mentioned in question ii) result in 
more/earlier investments from your side?  
 
All the interviewees argue, to some extent, that reducing the institutional barriers for FDI in 
Rwanda’s power sector would lead to more and earlier investments (a, b, c, d and e). Karasoy 
(e) states that there are several things that the Rwandan government could do in order to foster 
more and earlier investments. As an example, if the Rwandan government would have been 
more experienced and efficient in negotiating the PPA, Hakan would have reached further in 
their construction by now. However, Karasoy (e) points out that Rwanda already done a lot to 
enhance the business climate. The government are developing its know-how, use good 
incentives such as tax reductions and beneficial PPAs, and are increasing its knowledge about 
its power sector. Considering the state Rwanda was in for 20 years ago, the progress has been 
remarkable. Karasoy (e) emphasize, that from a realistic perspective, one couldn’t expect the 
government to have reached any further.  
 
Klinck (d) is certain reduction of Rwanda’s institutional barriers would lead to more, and 
especially, earlier investment. As an example, constructing DC Hydropower’s power plant 
would only take three months. If the government had standardized PPA and concession 
agreements, the power plant would already be up and running.  
 
Ekman (c) explain that reducing Rwanda’s institutional barriers would facilitate for the foreign 
direct investors to in an early stage decide whether they should continue with their investments 
or not. Ekman (c) points out that the Rwandan government have done several improvements, 
but still emphasise the importance that the government continue on this path. An unclear 
investment processes may risk investors to avoid Rwanda. 
 
Interviewee 4 (b) argue that the government still have to develop and improve the business 
climate for foreign investors. However, it has to be done in a controlled and responsible manner. 
 
Twagirashema (a) explain that the Rwandan government still have several improvements to 
make, especially in the area of off-grid solutions and financing. Twagirashema is likely to 
continue to invest in Rwanda’s power sector, yet he requests an improved business climate. 
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5. ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, the empirical findings are analyzed and compared with previous research. 
Furthermore, since the purpose of this thesis is to identify how the institutional barriers the 
foreign investors perceive the barriers, this chapter also discuss which of the identified 
barriers which are perceived as most important by the investors. 
The literature review shows that several institutional barriers may prevent foreign direct 
investors to enter new markets. Some barriers are general for all industries, while others focus 
on the power sector specifically. The empirical findings show that most of the barriers discussed 
in the literature review, also is considered important by the foreign investors in Rwanda’s power 
sector. Table 2 present the barriers which has been discussed in the empirical findings and the 
literature review. Moreover, Table 2 also shows whether the interviewees of this research 
consider the identified barriers to be of great negative importance for Rwanda’s power sector 
(key barrier in Rwanda´s power sector). It is important to acknowledge that some of the barriers 
are overlapping and hence may be depended on each other. Furthermore, several of the barriers 
are connected to governmental regulations. Therefore, this barrier has been divided in to nine 
sub-barriers.  
 
Table 2 – Coherence between theory and empirical findings 
 
Institutional Barriers Theory 
Empirical 
Findings 
Key barrier in 
Rwanda’s 
power sector 
Political instability Yes Yes No 
Corruption Yes Yes No 
Low domestic security level Yes Yes No 
Investment incentives Yes Yes To some extent 
Poor energy planning No Yes Yes 
Insufficient transparency Yes Yes Yes 
Poor financing institutions Yes Yes Yes 
Lack of know-how Yes Yes To some extent 
Risk connected to the foreign 
exchange rates 
Yes No No 
Poor governmental regulations Yes Yes Yes 
Ownership restrictions Yes No No 
Rate of return restrictions Yes No No 
Risks associated with project 
approval process (delays etc.) 
Yes Yes Yes 
Ambiguity of relevant laws and 
regulations 
Yes Yes Yes 
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Institutional Barriers Theory 
Empirical 
Findings 
Key barrier in 
Rwanda’s 
power sector 
Poor electricity pricing methods 
that not represent the costs 
Yes Yes To some extent 
Risk related to weak contract 
enforcement  
Yes No No 
Credit risks of power purchaser Yes No No 
Lack of standardized PPA Yes Yes Yes 
Lack of standardized concession 
agreements 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
As show in table 2, the barriers discussed in the literature review, is often considered to be 
important by the foreign direct investors in Rwanda’s power sector. However, it is also clear 
that Rwanda successfully have manage to reduce the influence of some of the barriers.  
 
Adeleke, Olowe and Fasesin’s (2014) points out that political stability, low corruption and 
high domestic security level are vital in order to attract foreign investors. A country which it 
not able to provide these fundamental business elements may create barriers perceived as 
frightening for new foreign investors. The empirical findings support this statement and all the 
interviewees state that political stability and low corruption are important elements in their 
investment decisions (a,b,c,d and e). Furthermore, some of the interviewees (b, c and e) claim 
that the security level has been considered in their investment decisions. However, the 
interviewees seem to be united in this matter. Rwanda has successfully managed to avoid these 
barriers and none of the interviewees claim that any of these potential barriers are problematic 
for foreign investors in Rwanda. On the contrary, political stability, low corruption and high 
domestic security are reasons why investors are interested of Rwanda. Furthermore, Adeleke, 
Olowe and Fasesin’s (2014) and Interviewee 4 (b) agrees that this is not the situation in all 
African countries.  
 
Blomström and Kokko (2003) argue that investment incentives are increasingly important and 
state that lack of beneficial investment incentive may make investors to choose other markets. 
It is clear that investment incentives also are considered to be important by the interviewees of 
this research. Karasoy (e) explains that investment incentives, such as tax reductions and a 
beneficial PPA, was essential in their investment decision. Hence, in the case of Hakan AS, it 
seems like Rwanda managed to provide sufficient amount of investment incentives to attract 
the investor. Interviewee 4 (b) explains that Rwanda has several investment incentives and that 
more are to come. Investment incentives for off-grid renewable energy solutions is mentioned 
as one example. However, the empirical findings indicate that the investment incentives are not 
to the full satisfaction, causing the investors to invest less or later. Ekman (c) acknowledge that 
Rwanda has managed to establish several beneficial investment incentives, however, the 
incentives is not fully coordinated nor transparent. Ekman (e) continue to explain that the 
investment incentives to some extent is negotiated, resulting in different conditions for the 
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investors. This hamper a smooth and clear investment process. Klinck (d) explains that the 
barriers present in Rwanda’s power sector depends on the type of energy source, so also for 
barriers related to investment incentives. According to Klinck (d), Rwanda need to develop 
more investment incentives and mention the solar sector as one important area to work with. 
To conclude, Rwanda has through implementation of investment incentives managed to reduce 
some barriers connected to this area. However, the lack of clear and transparent investment 
incentives is still perceived as a barrier by some of the foreign direct investors in Rwanda’s 
power sector. 
Some of the investors (c and d) discussed the possibility of short term energy surplus as a risk 
for potential investors. Ekman (c) explain that the Rwandan government has been ambiguous 
in their communication of its need of power investors. On one hand, the government 
communicate the country’s tremendous need for more electricity. On the other hand, the 
government seem to be afraid of too many investors. Government officials (b) confirm Ekman’s 
(c) concern and explain that the government is uncertain of how much electricity the country 
needs and when the country will need it. This creates uncertainties for the foreign investors and 
Klinck (d) explains that the risks of short term energy surplus make the investors hesitating. 
Hence, it is clear that poor energy planning is a barrier which creates uncertainties and risks 
for some of the foreign power investors in Rwanda. This barrier was not covered by the previous 
literature which has been examined in this research. 
Insufficient transparency can be connected to many other barriers and can occur in several 
stages of the investment process. Adeleke, Olowe and Fasesin (2014) explain that lack of 
transparency is one of the reasons why some foreign investors avoid investments in Nigeria. 
Lack of transparency also seem to be some problematic in Rwanda. Interviewee 4 (b) explain 
that the concession agreements and power purchase agreements are confidential, making it 
difficult to compare power project against each other. As previously described, this is also a 
concern for Ekman (c) and Klinck (d) who believe the lack of transparency creates barriers for 
the investors. According to Ekman (c), the low level of transparency can make it easier for the 
government to apply different contracts and conditions for different investors, on one hand 
increasing the government’s bargaining power. However, according to Ekman (c) and Klinck 
(d), the low transparency also keeps some of the investors away from the country. 
Poor financing institutions is problematic for some investors in Rwanda (a and d). 
Twagirashema (a) explain that the access to affordable loans is limiting investments in the 
country. Klinick (d) agrees and explain that the access to the local currency is difficult. Also 
the previous research have identified poor financing institutions as potential barrier. Similarly, 
Soubbotina and Sheram (2004) claim that easy convertibility to the local currency is essential 
for foreign investors. 
Blomström and Kokko (2003) explain that the governmental know-how has a major influence 
on foreign investors. Karasoy (e) also discuss the governmental know-how and claim that the 
lack of know-how at the governmental institutions is problematic in Rwanda. According to 
Karasoy (e), the lack of know-how makes the investment process slow and the government has 
not been able to establish well-functioning routines for the investment process. Yet, Karasoy 
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(e) emphasize that this is understandable considering that Rwanda has been forced to develop 
all its routines during the last 20 years. 
Risk connected to the foreign exchange rates is according to Blackman and Wu (1998) a 
potential barrier for foreign direct investors. Only one of the interviewees, Karasoy (e), 
discussed the risks associated with foreign exchange rates. According to Karasoy, Hakan AS 
has managed to hedge the risk, and hence, risks associated with foreign exchange rates is not 
considered to be of any substantial relevance for Hakan. 
A significant amount of the previous research identifies poor governmental regulations as a 
potential barrier for foreign investors. For instance, Blomström and Kokko (2003) explain that 
trade policies and other governmental regulations are central determinants for foreign investors’ 
investment decisions. Similarly, Soubbotina and Sheram (2004) explain that liberal government 
regulations are essential elements in investors investment decisions. Among the interviewees, 
a majority believes that the governmental regulations in Rwanda are, to at least some extent, 
problematic for Rwanda’s power sector (b, c, d and e). Blackman and Wu (1998) points out that 
governmental regulations could be divided into several sub-barriers. Therefore, this barrier will 
be examined more thoroughly and is hence divided into nine sub-barriers. 
Ambiguity of relevant laws and regulations can be connected to many other types of barriers 
associated to the government regulations.  Blackman and Wu’s (1998) research shows that this 
barrier was perceived as most the most severe barrier by the foreign investors in China’s power 
sector. To some extent, this is also true for the foreign investors in Rwanda’s power sector. 
Three of the interviewees (c, d and e) points out that the lack of standardized PPA and 
concession agreements are severe barriers for the foreign investors in Rwanda, especially for 
smaller entrepreneurs. The reason why these areas are considered that important depends on 
the investors’ wish to have similar conditions for all investors. 
Risks associated with project approval process (delays etc.) is, in Backman and Wu’s (1998) 
research, identified as the second most severe barrier for foreign investors in China’s power 
sector. Ambiguity of relevant laws and regulations may be one reasons to the perceived risks in 
the project approval process. Interviewee (b) explains that many investors are not able to go 
through the full project approval process, indicating that barriers connected to this area may be 
problematic for Rwanda. Klinick (d) described that it so far has taken two years to get all the 
approvals and all necessary contracts signed, hence creating a barrier for DC Hydropower. 
Klinick (d) claims that the length of this process is significant, even by African standards. Risk 
associated with the project approval process is obviously a concern for the foreign investors in 
Rwanda.  
Poor electricity pricing methods that not represent the costs is according to Backman and 
Wu’s (1998) a potential barrier for foreign investors. Interviewee 4 (b) explain that the PPA not 
always represents the productions costs. This is especially true for environmental friendly 
sources of energy. The reasons is that the government assume that the power producers get 
financed by NGO, and hence include this in the calculations. Klinck (d) believes this fact is a 
bit problematic. Dependence on NGO increase the uncertainties for the investors.  
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Rate of return restrictions, Risk related to weak contract enforcement, Credit risks of 
power purchaser and Ownership restrictions is covered as potential barriers by the previous 
literature, but was not mentioned as barriers during the interviews. Blackman and Wu (1998) 
describe that ownership restrictions is one of the least severe barriers in China’s power sector. 
To some extent, this also seem to be the situation in Rwanda.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
Linked to the research questions, this chapter discuss the final conclusions of this research. 
The chapter ends with suggestions for further research. 
This research has identified several institutional barriers present in Rwanda’s power sector and 
shown how these are perceived by the foreign investors, see table 3. It is clear that the identified 
barriers prevent some foreign investors to enter the Rwandan power sector. All foreign investors 
that participated in this research claims that reducing the present barriers would make them to 
invest more and/or earlier. The barriers also increase the costs for the investors. Yet, the 
research has also shown that Rwanda has undergone tremendous progress and successfully 
managed to reduce the influence of some of its barriers – barriers some of Rwanda’s 
neighboring countries suffers from. Due to this fact, Rwanda has caught several foreign 
investors interest. Even though it is unclear how much electricity Rwanda will need in the short 
term, it is obvious that Rwanda, as a country with one of the world’s lowest energy consumption 
per capita in the world, will need to develop its power capacity significantly in the long term. 
Even though Rwanda would manage to achieve their ambitious targets to 2025, attracting USD 
6.9 billion investments in the power sector, their energy generation will still be far behind the 
rest of the world. Hence, continuing improving the power sectors attractiveness for foreign 
investors will be essential in order for continued economic development.  
Table 3 – Institutional barriers for FDI in Rwanda’s power sector  
Potential Barriers Perceived as barrier by the investors 
Investment incentives To some extent 
Poor energy planning Yes 
Insufficient transparency Yes 
Poor financing institutions Yes 
Lack of know-how To some extent 
Poor governmental regulations Yes 
Risks associated with project approval 
process (delays etc.) 
Yes 
Ambiguity of relevant laws and regulations Yes 
Poor electricity pricing methods that not 
represent the costs 
To some extent 
Lack of standardized PPA Yes 
Lack of standardized concession agreements Yes 
 
It is important to acknowledge the limitations of this research. The empirical data is based on 
five interviews. Given the extent of the power sector, it is unlikely that this study has been able 
to identify all institutional barriers which prevent foreign investors to invest in Rwanda’s power 
sector. Yet, the result of this thesis identifies the institutional barriers some of the key investors 
perceive as most limiting. 
Similar to previous research, this thesis shows that barriers for foreign investors is country and 
sector specific. Hence, it is of importance to examine barriers for even more sectors. 
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Previous research has shown that some barriers is important, creating a healthy industry which 
prevent unserious investors to enter the market. The purpose of this thesis hasn’t been to 
examine whether the present institutional barriers are beneficial for the country nor trying to 
explain which of the barriers which should be eliminated or reduced. However, it appears that 
some of the identified barriers create more damage than benefits.  
To conclude, Rwanda reached far in its creation of an efficient and an investment friendly 
business environment. However, Rwanda needs to continue to reduce its institutional barriers 
in order to keep and attract foreign investors.  
6.1 Further research 
As previously mentioned, the purpose of this thesis hasn’t been to identify which of the 
present barriers the Rwandan government should keep, reduce or eliminate. Further research 
could hence focus on determining which of the barriers which is necessary to keep and which 
of the barriers that should be eased or removed. Furthermore, this research has shown that the 
barriers are country and sector specific. Hence, in order to get a holistic understanding of the 
barriers for foreign investors, it is of importance to examine even more countries and sectors. 
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Semi-structured interview: 
Institutional Barriers for Foreign Direct Investment in Rwandan Power Sector 
 
 
vi) Introduction and presentation of my research. 
 
vii) Could you briefly describe your company and your project in Rwanda? 
Purpose: To confirm I understood the project properly and to get an update about the projects 
current situation. 
 
viii) Which are the reasons why you invested in Rwanda and not in other countries? 
Purpose: This question is intended to opening up the discussion. Furthermore, it gives an indication 
of which barriers which may not be present in Rwanda and which the incentives are for investing in 
the country. 
 
ix) Which institutional investment barriers have you experienced in Rwanda?  
Purpose: This is the main question and is intended to give a good understanding of the investments 
barriers for foreign investors. 
 
Follow-up questions: 
 
3) Are these barriers also available in other countries (Sub-African or the country of your origin)? 
4) Considering your firm-specific conditions, do you think you experience (or do not experience) 
barriers which other firms may experience? (Domestic vs. Foreign, Type of energy source, 
Large vs. Small, etc.) 
 
x) What could the Rwandan government do in order to reduce these barriers and improve the 
business climate? 
Purpose: To get an understanding of which barriers that could be reduced and to get an indication 
of which of the barriers the investors perceive most limiting.   
 
xi) Would these measures (implementing the actions mentioned in question v) result in 
more/earlier investments from your side?  
Some barriers may be seen as inconvenient or as “profit-limiting” for the investors, but may not 
change their investment behaviour. This question is intended to give an understanding of the 
sensitivity among the investors. 
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